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Introduction 
Considerable attention has been paid by a number of interested parties in recent years 
to analyzing the damaging impact of banking crises on the economy. Economists are 
concerned about the causal relationship between recessions and banking crises. International 
investors would like to predict output growth more accurately, given a banking crisis in the 
country in which they are investing. Banking supervisory authorities are interested if their 
instruments to sustain financial stability are required for stable output growth, while 
policymakers need to assess to what extent liberal policies promoting lending and investments 
increase the probability of financial instability and possible losses.  
The relationship between banking crises and economic growth has been extensively 
investigated in the literature. Two main areas of specific interest are fiscal costs and output 
losses suffered by economies during crises (Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan, 2005; 
Gupta, 2005). Some research has analyzed the fiscal costs associated with crisis resolutions 
and found them to be extremely high in many cases, although they are difficult to calculate 
and compare across countries (e.g. the database of Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003). 
Alternatively, declines in output growth during banking crises have often been investigated. 
Output growth is an important economic activity measure, comparable across countries, and 
should contain the effects of fiscal costs on the economy.  
The average estimated output losses associated with banking crises varied 
considerably in different studies, depending on the sample and the estimation method, from 
less than 1 up to 8 percentage points of output growth for each year of a crisis (Barro, 2001; 
Hutchison and Noy, 2005), and from 4 to 20 percent of cumulative GDP loss or more during a 
crisis (Barro, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta, 2006; Hoggarth, Reis, and 
Saporta, 2002; Boyd, Kwak, and Smith, 2005; Hutchison and Noy, 2005). However, the 
above studies were generally unable to identify whether output losses were caused by banking 
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crises, or vice versa. In the latter case, it could be recessions and not banking crises that 
caused lower GDP growth.   
This study analyses the impact of banking crises on GDP growth. It extends earlier 
research in four ways. First, it empirically analyses the costs of banking crises after 
controlling for the downward impact of recessions on banking activity. To do so, we use a 
multiple-equation identification and estimation technique which is novel to studies of the 
costs of banking crises.  
Second, it proposes several variables to control for the macroeconomic significance of 
crises, with the aim of analyzing how the size of a crisis, measured in macroeconomic terms, 
affects economic growth.1 This fills a clear gap in the literature, as earlier studies purely 
distinguish between systemic and non-systemic crises or identify policies used to resolve the 
crises to calculate their costs. 
Third, our study uses macroeconomic measures of the extent of crises in order to 
analyze the two main paths whereby banking crises may affect output growth, i.e. the credit 
and monetary channels. In this way our paper bridges the gap between research on the credit–
output relationship and the monetary transmission mechanism, and studies on the costs of 
banking crises (e.g. Loayza, Rancière, 2005; Psaradakis, Ravn and Sola, 2005). 
Finally, this study applies the event-study approach, which uses a large database of 
banking crises in developed and emerging markets from the late 1970s to the first years of the 
new century, as developed by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). We construct a set of variables 
calculated with a yearly frequency preceding and following the crisis dates by zero up to 
seven years. In this way we are able to compare the properties of macroeconomic variables 
before and after the crises. 
                                                 
1
 Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2005) use variables related to credit growth to compare long-run economic 
growth in countries with stable financial systems, and countries suffering from systemic financial crises.  
 3 
The paper is organized as follows. The method of calculating the impact of banking 
crises on output growth is presented in Section 2. Section 3 contains empirical results. Finally, 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology 
 In this section we describe the method used to measure the impact of banking crises on 
the economy. We propose macroeconomic measures to determine the magnitude of banking 
crises, examine the relationship between such crises and output growth, and then explain our 
econometric method used to estimate how these measures affect output growth. 
2.1 Measures to determine the size of a banking crisis 
In this paper we follow Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and define banking crises as 
“much or all of bank capital being exhausted”. Such crises typically comprise large-scale 
bank failures, depositor runs, the high level of non-performing loans, or some emergency 
actions of the government (deposit freezes, nationalizations, recapitalization plans etc.) (e.g. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta, 2006). 
Previous studies have estimated the average impact of banking crises on GDP growth 
or production growth in selected sectors of the economy, taking into account crisis length, 
resolution policies, evidence of twin crises, i.e. joint currency and banking crises, and triple 
crises when sovereign debt is also involved (e.g. IMF, 1998; Frydl, 1999; Honohan and 
Klingebiel, 2000; Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2001; 
Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta, 2002). Moreover, these studies usually distinguish between 
systemic and non-systemic crises, and measure the fiscal costs of some crises, but none have 
attempted to measure the size of individual crises in terms of macroeconomic variables such 
as the fall in domestic credit, deposits, or the monetary base. 
We propose four measures of the extent of a banking crisis. First, the percentage 
change in real credit is used to account for a drop in credit supply due to multiple bank 
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failures, more restrictive credit rationing policies of commercial banks, losses and increased 
capital provisions lowering capital base and limiting the credit supply in line with regulatory 
capital requirements (e.g., Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann, 2005). The choice of this 
variable is motivated by the literature on a credit channel in the monetary transmission 
mechanism and the existence of a financial accelerator amplifying real economic fluctuations 
(e.g., threshold effects in the US - Balke, 2000, in the UK – Atanasova, 2003, and in the EU – 
Calza and Sousa, 2005). 
We also experimented with the spread between the lending interest rate and the policy 
rate as our measure of credit rationing during crises. This variable increases two years before 
the crisis and then falls during the crisis to its pre-crisis level. Therefore, the spread appears to 
be a superior predictor of banking crises, but is less useful as a measure of crisis extent.2  
Second, we use changes in aggregate deposits after controlling for the impact of 
interest paid on these deposits to measure the extent of banking crises. Let rt denote the 
deposit interest rate at time t and dt be the net deposit inflows as percentage of old deposits, 
i.e. the difference between new deposit inflows and deposit withdrawals at time t, divided by 
the value of deposits at time t-1 (e.g., Willis, 1960). The aggregate deposits Dt at time t 
depend on the value of deposits from time t-1, new deposit inflows, old deposit outflows, and 
the interest paid on old deposits:  
1111 −−−− ⋅+⋅+= tttttt rDdDDD        (1) 
From equation (1) we find the net deposit inflows as a percentage of old deposits to 
equal: 
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Lower values of dt during banking crises describe investors’ flight to liquidity (e.g., Gupta, 
2005). The more severe the crisis, the higher the probability of bank runs and the lower 
                                                 
2
 Other measures of credit rationing are also available (e.g., Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996; Balke, 2000). 
However, data for such variables are not available in many developing countries from our dataset. 
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propensity to keep deposits in banks. In extreme cases the value of dt could become negative 
if there were less new deposits than deposit withdrawals or the percentage increase in 
aggregate deposits was lower than the deposit interest rate. 
The third measure of banking crises, bt, is the difference between changes in the 
money supply and changes in the amount of cash in circulation. Here, we also take into 
account the increase in the money supply due to the interest paid on demand, time, savings, 
and foreign currency deposits. The percentage growth of money supply is given by: 
1
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tt
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MMh ,        (3) 
where Mt is the money supply at time t. Since the money aggregate contains cash in 
circulation G, interest is paid only to the part of the money supply. Thus, we use the 
parameter k that belongs to the interval (0, 1) to proxy an average interest rate trk ⋅  of the 
money aggregate.3 Then the third variable is calculated using the following expression: 
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Like the second measure, this third measure may be used to proxy the propensity to save 
during calm and crisis periods. This is analogous to the change in a cash-deposit ratio used by 
Gupta (2005), who notes that this ratio increases during banking crises. Therefore the deposit 
and money aggregates grow slower in comparison to cash during crises. 
  The fourth measure used in our investigation is the percentage change in real money. 
The rate of money growth decreases during crises because of credit rationing and investor 
flight from the banking system. This measure is especially interesting, because it allows for a 
comparison with other studies of the money – output relationship. Empirical research has 
found that such relationship is usually significant in both directions. Output growth causes 
changes in the money supply, and increases in money have an impact on output growth 
                                                 
3
 k is lower than 1, because the market interest rate r is higher than the interest rates of deposits and other 
components from the money aggregate. 
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(Bernanke, 1986; Christiano, Ljungquist, 1988; Stock, Watson, 1996; Psaradakis, Ravn and 
Sola, 2005; and others).  
2.2 Relationship between banking crises and output growth  
Output growth can be affected by banking crises in at least six different ways (e.g., 
Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta, 2002). First, a number of bank failures reduces credit and money 
supply and may lead to a recession. Falling credit supply can force companies and households 
to limit both investment and consumption, which will result in a decrease of output in the 
short run. Second, in the long run lower investments reduce capital growth and productivity. 
Third, bank failures can generate the loss of information about customers, hinder obtaining 
credit elsewhere, and as a result increase the costs of economic activity. Fourth, preventive 
policies of banks restrict credit only to firms in a relatively good shape and cause weaker 
firms to go bankrupt. More restrictive credit limits may also force companies to cut trade 
credits to their customers and subsequently to reduce output (e.g., Love, Preve and Sarria-
Allende, 2007). Fifth, depositors may lose confidence in banks, or banks may lose confidence 
in other banks, causing the payment system to malfunction, and destroying trade. Finally, 
banking crises may also be accompanied by debt and currency crises. Such “twin” or “triple” 
crises will lead to even stronger contractions in economic activity, e.g. via balance sheet 
effects (e.g., Hutchison and Noy, 2005). 
There is also another side to the relationship: falling output growth has an impact on 
different banking crisis measures, such as credit growth or deposit growth. Recessions cause 
non-performing loans of companies to grow rapidly and consequently cause bank losses and 
increase capital provisions. Increased provisions in turn limit the credit rationing activity of 
banks. Declining asset prices during recessions also reduce the value of firms and their 
collateral required to obtain credit. Less collateral means that firms receive less credit. More 
restrictive lending policies on the part of banks make credit unavailable to weaker companies. 
Additionally, companies with balance sheet problems may reduce their demand for bank 
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loans during recessions. Severe bank losses and reduced economic activity can in addition 
lead to illiquidity problems or defaults, and reduce aggregate credit growth.  
A recession or economic slowdown affects money and deposits. Households may save 
less during recessions due to declining earnings and greater unemployment. Liquidity 
problems may also lead to bank runs, reducing deposits and savings even further. The 
empirical literature confirms that the fall in output among other factors is a good predictor of 
banking crises (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
2.3 Econometric approach 
To estimate the relationship between the extent of the crisis and output growth, we 
employ an event-study method. A typical event-study employs one-equation models to check 
for the dependence of a selected variable on a specific event. However, in the case of a 
banking crisis, the variables to measure the crisis and output growth affect each other in the 
sample. In such circumstances the standard event-study using one-equation estimation 
methods would provide biased results due to omitted bidirectional dependence (e.g., Rigobon 
and Sack, 2004).  
A straightforward solution to this problem is to employ a system of equations, where 
both output growth and the banking crisis variable affect each other in separate equations. We 
build the following two-equation model describing the link between crisis measure and output 
growth: 
 
itititit
itititit
Bxcy
Axyc
ηβ
εα
++=
++=
,         (5) 
where itc  denotes the crisis size variable (e.g., credit growth) in country i at time t, and ity  
represents output growth. itx  is a column vector of factors including a constant term that 
influences both endogenous variables, A and B are row vectors of structural parameters, and 
itε  and itη  are independent disturbance shocks. The parameter α  describes the impact of 
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output on the size of the crisis. A 1 percentage point fall in output growth increases the size of 
a crisis (e.g., decreases the credit growth) by α  percentage points. 
Similarly, the parameter β  denotes fall in output growth (in percentage points) after 
the 1 percentage point fall in credit growth or another measure of the extent of the crisis. 
Thus, the parameter β  measures the average effect of banking crises on output growth after 
controlling for the impact of changes in output growth on crisis measures. If banking crises 
matter for output growth, the parameter β  should be significantly different from zero.  
To assess how banking crises reduce output growth, one needs to identify and estimate 
the parameters of an output growth equation. However, the output equation is not identifiable, 
unless one proposes an exogenous variable that influences directly credit growth, but not 
output growth. This task is difficult due to the lack of such variables that are available for 
approximately 100 countries in our sample. When the ordinary least squares method (OLS) is 
applied to the output growth equation, i.e. when the identification problem is ignored, the 
estimate of β will be biased.  
This identification problem is an important issue in studies analyzing costs of banking 
crises. Some researchers argue that their calculations estimate output losses during the crisis 
rather than the loss in output “caused” by the crisis (e.g., Boyd, Kwak, Smith, 2005). Others 
attempt to identify the costs of banking crises by comparing the behavior of crisis countries 
with neighboring countries that did not face the crisis (Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta, 2002) or 
by comparing the performance of firms more dependent on external finance with those less 
dependent (Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan, 2005, Kroszner, Leaven and Klingebiel, 
2007). In a different context, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) use lagged values of credit and 
deposits as instruments and estimate the impact of financial development on economic 
growth.  
We deal with the identification problem by defining a set of the econometric 
instruments that are correlated with our banking crisis measures but not correlated with the 
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disturbance shock ηit in the output growth equation in model (5). We use the “identification 
through heteroscedasticity” (IH) method, proposed by Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack 
(2004) and the analogous “identification through changes in mean” (ICM) technique to 
estimate the impact of banking crises on output growth. 
Let the variance of the disturbance shock εit to the crisis measure change between the 
two sub-samples T1 and T2. There are N1 observations of εit in the sub-sample T1 and N2 
observations in the sub-sample T2. The whole sample consists of N = N1+N2 observations of 
analyzed variables. The variances of the disturbance shock ηit and the control variables xit 
remain constant in these sub-samples. The valid instruments for the crisis variable cit in model 
(5) are: 
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 Additionally, when there is a negative or positive shock to the crisis equation that 
changes the mean of our crisis measure cit in one of the sub-samples T1 and T2 without 
affecting the disturbance shock ηit or control variables xit, then another instrument may be 
used: 
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This instrument is analogous to the dummy variable indicating crisis periods, used by 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) in the regressions explaining output growth. 
However, they use the OLS method to estimate output growth during crises. 
All instruments vcit, vyit and mit enable us to identify the output equation and to 
estimate the parameter β  in model (5) consistently using the generalized method of moments 
(GMM).4 Although the instruments have a clear interpretation in our investigation, the 
validity of overidentification restrictions imposed by these instruments can be tested using the 
Sargan-Hansen J-statistic.       
We justify the use of the identification method in the following way. We note that 
means and variances of the crisis measures may change during the calm and banking crisis 
periods or may depend on the given country’s economic and financial development.  
First, the banking aggregates are not only affected by macroeconomic variables and 
recession during crises, but also by idiosyncratic shocks that are specific to the banking sector 
and independent from real business cycles. Such shocks include financial problems and 
failures of banking institutions caused by bad management, insufficient supervisory 
regulations, frauds, contagion from other institutions or other events not related to the 
economic slowdown. All of these shocks reduce credit, deposit and money growth even 
further than the real business cycle does. 
Second, the levels of financial and economic development also determine pace of 
credit, deposit, and money growth. This pace may be higher and more volatile in countries 
with less developed financial sectors due to the low initial level of credit and deposits, 
immature supervisory regulations, foreign investments (large in relation to the size of the 
local financial sectors), and other factors related to the catching-up process. Undeveloped 
                                                 
4
 The crisis measure equation in (5) remains unidentifiable, i.e. it cannot be estimated. We explain the derivation 
of instruments in the IH and ICM methods in Appendix 1.  
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countries often conduct less reliable economic policies resulting in high inflation rates that 
decrease credit and deposit growth, measured in real terms. 
 
3. Data and empirical results 
3.1 Data  
The first important part of the investigation is the identification of banking crisis 
episodes. We utilize the most comprehensive database of systemic and borderline banking 
crises constructed by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), which includes 168 crisis events from 
over 100 countries. Caprio and Klingebiel argue that some judgment has gone into 
compilation of their list; however, systemic crises are generally defined as “much or all of 
bank capital being exhausted”. The starting dates of most crises are also taken from this 
database, with a few others chosen using the information from Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta 
(2002) and macroeconomic data.5  
All variables in our investigation are observed in a 14-year window from seven years 
before the crisis to seven years after. In this way we can compare the behavior of 
macroeconomic variables before and during the crisis. For example, the difference between 
the rate of credit growth during the crisis and before the crisis may indicate how significant 
the banking crisis was (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta, 2006).  
The ending dates of banking crises are usually more difficult to identify. In order to 
overcome this problem, we measure the effects of crises over different time horizons. Our 
idea is to analyze data with different frequencies. Changes in output, credit and other 
variables are analyzed and compared from one year up to seven years. For each crisis the 
variables are measured twice: during the pre-crisis period and during the crisis period. 
                                                 
5
 When the exact starting dates were unknown, they were set as years when credit and other banking aggregates 
started to fall or changed their trends. The periods of banking crises are presented in Table A1. 
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Since the somewhat imprecise definition of a crisis used by Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) makes the choice of some crises rather problematic, the choice of crisis-extent 
measures becomes a major issue. As reported in the previous section, we use percentage 
changes in real credit, net deposit inflows (as percentage of old deposits), differences between 
money supply changes and changes of cash in circulation, and percentage increases of real 
money. The percentage changes of the respective variables are approximated by increases in 
their log values.  
The data for output growth and crisis instruments were gathered from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund. Some observations 
come from the ECOWIN database, when IFS data were unavailable. In addition we exclude a 
few crises for which data could not be obtained, and we have removed data for some 
countries that changed their definitions in the sample.  
The output growth is calculated as an increase in the log-value of real GDP. In rare 
cases, when the GDP deflator was not available for some observations, nominal GDP was 
deflated with the consumption price index (CPI). Deposits are demand deposits, money 
aggregate is M2 (money plus quasi-money) in the IFS database, credit is the domestic credit 
and cash is defined as the currency outside banks in the IFS database.  
Changes in the real effective exchange rate and the real interest rate are used as the 
main explanatory variables for output growth and banking aggregates changes. These data 
also come from the IFS database. An appreciating exchange rate may decrease the value of 
credit and deposits denominated in foreign currencies and worsen the balance of foreign trade 
and GDP growth. Higher interest rates reduce investment and output growth, increase 
deposits, decrease demand for credit and increase the interest paid on loans.  
The values of deposit interest rates, which are used in two crisis measures described 
by formulas (2) and (4), were not available for all countries in the dataset. Therefore we 
employed a fraction of a short-term market interest rate as a proxy for the deposit rate in all 
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countries.6 We also experimented with the inflation rate and different fractions of a short-term 
market interest rate and received similar results.  
We construct indicators of the level of democracy for each country using the POLITY 
IV database.7 Such a variable could possibly have an impact on output growth and credit 
growth as a proxy for the political impact on financial markets and the real economy. As 
many examples of communist and other authoritarian regimes suggest, autocracy and 
dictatorship hinder economic activity, so the level of democracy may point to the level of 
economic development in a country. Similarly, Gross National Income (GNI) per capita for 
each country is used as another proxy for the long-term level of economic development.8 
The following distinct binary variables are employed to denote periods of currency 
crises in some countries and to identify cases of systemic crises, respectively. The variable 
currcrisisit takes on value 1 in the periods (crisis or calm), where the real effective exchange 
rate falls by more than 25% during at least one year, and 0 in other periods. As Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) note, banking crises accompanied by currency crises (twin crises) have a 
more significant impact on economic growth than individual banking crises. The variable 
systemicit equals 1 in both calm and crisis periods related to the crises that are systemic 
according to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). This variable equals 0 for borderline crises. 
Similarly, the variable debtcrisisit equals 1 when there is a debt crisis in a country and 0 
otherwise. The periods of sovereign debt crises are taken from Manasse, Roubini and 
Schimmelpfennig (2003).  
The effect of currency and debt crises on economy may depend on the foreign 
exchange regime, therefore we also define the variable fxregimeit that takes on value 1 in the 
                                                 
6
 The deposit rate is calibrated to equal one-half of the market rate, with the parameter k equal 0.3 in formula (3). 
The general results do not change when we use other values of these parameters. 
7
 The POLITY IV database is maintained through a partnership between the University of Maryland’s Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management and the George Mason University Center for Global 
Policy.  
8
 We obtained GNI per capita for the year 1975 from the World Bank database. Since the analysis focuses on the 
short-term (up to seven years) costs of banking crises, the year of an observation for the long-term development 
indicator should have a limited impact on our results. 
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fixed exchange rate regime, 2 in the regime with a fixed peg or pegged within a horizontal 
band, 3 in the regimes with crawling peg, crawling band, and dirty float, and 4 in the floating 
exchange rate regime. We use data on currency regimes from Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger 
(2005) and Babula and Ötker-Robe (2002).     
3.2 Empirical results    
Our analysis focuses on the impact of banking crises on output growth after 
controlling for the influence of recessions and other macroeconomic shocks. We start by 
presenting differences between the values of crisis instruments in pre-crisis and crisis periods, 
and then show key estimates from the event study method. 
We calculate values of the four crisis measures and output growth in different time 
horizons, and investigate one-year up to seven-year changes in real credit for the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods, averaged over all banking crises. Similar calculations are conducted for 
changes in deposits, for differences between changes of money and changes in cash, and for 
real money increases. In order to compare the behavior of banking crisis measures and output 
growth, we also analyze the accumulated GDP growth over the same time horizons. Figure 1 
presents differences between the values of the instruments in pre-crisis and crisis periods in 
panel A and the analogous results for output growth in panel B. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
Two main findings can be deduced from these results. First, most of the crisis 
measures take on lower values during banking crises than before crises. The average real 
credit grows until one year before the crisis and then stagnates until the third year of a crisis. 
Deposits and money supply also increase much slower during the whole crisis period than 
during the pre-crisis period. However, the difference between money growth and the growth 
of cash is only lower during the first three years of an average crisis than before it. In the 
longer term, the difference is larger in the crisis period than in the period of calm. 
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Second, output growth behaves like the four crisis instruments in our analysis. Real 
GDP grows more rapidly during periods of calm than during the periods of crisis. The 
difference in the rate of output growth between the two regimes varies from two percentage 
points for the one-year event window up to nine percentage points for the seven-year event 
window. This outcome is in line with Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2006).  
These results indicate how macroeconomic variables change their values during 
banking crises, but they cannot provide any information on the effects of banking crises on 
economic growth. Therefore, we utilize the IH and ICM methods and estimate different 
specifications of the output equation in model (7) to measure how the size of a crisis impacts 
economic growth. 
The identification methods used in our investigation require sub-samples T1 and T2 to 
be constructed. There are three different ways in which the estimation sample is divided into 
sub-samples in our investigation. We distinguish between calm and crisis periods, developed 
and undeveloped economies, developed and undeveloped financial sectors. For each crisis 
event we select a period tcalm before the crisis and a period tcrisis after the start of the crisis. The 
whole sample consists of calm and crisis periods for each of Ncrisis crisis events. Therefore we 
have N=2Ncrisis observations in the estimation sample.  
The measure of economic development is Gross National Income per capita in each 
country in the year 1975 and the measure of financial development is the ratio of deposits to 
money supply in each country (averaged over the pre-crisis and crisis period).9 In order to 
obtain sub-samples with the same number of observations we use the median of the 
development measures to divide the sample into two sub-samples. Detailed formulas are 
presented in Table 1.10 
[Table 1 around here] 
                                                 
9
 We also experimented with GNI per capita in the year 2000 and seven years before the crisis. The results were 
very similar.   
10
 The number of observations is usually less than N and the sub-samples have approximately the same number 
of observations due to missing values of variables in some periods. 
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Table 1 reports means and variances of the output growth and crisis measures in each 
sub-sample. The analyzed variables often exhibit significant differences both in mean and in 
variance across sub-samples, which allows us to construct 18 distinct instruments in line with 
formulas (6), (7) and (8). The values of the respective banking crisis measures are utilized to 
build these instruments, as explained in Subsection 2.3. The names of the constructed 
instruments (in the fourth and seventh column) are presented in the same rows as their 
corresponding banking crisis measures in Table 1.  
Ideal instruments should be correlated with our crisis measures, but uncorrelated with 
the error term ηit. Therefore, for each of the crisis measures we select a set of instruments that 
are strongly correlated with the banking crisis variable and only modestly correlated with the 
output growth. Table 2 presents correlations between econometric instruments and analyzed 
variables. The instruments selected for each banking crisis measure are denoted with “*”. 
Then we use the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions and eliminate some 
instruments if the test rejects the restrictions imposed by these instruments.  
[Table 2 around here] 
For each of the crisis variables we employ four different specifications of the model 
(7). In the first specification, S1, the vector of control variables, xit, contains only the constant 
term. In the second version of the model, S2, the vector xit contains also changes in the real 
effective exchange rate and the real interest rate. Specification S3 includes additional binary 
variables: currcrisisit, debtcrisisit and systemicit, which identify currency crises, debt crises 
and systemic banking crises, respectively. The variable fxregimeit classifying the foreign 
exchange rate regime in each country is also included in the specification S3. Finally, in the 
last and most general version of our model (7), S4, the vector xit includes three measures of 
economic, political, and financial development aside from the already mentioned variables. 
These are GNI per capita in a country in 1975, the level of autocracy in a country at time t, 
and the ratio of cash in circulation to money supply, respectively. The first measure is a long-
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term variable that does not change over time; the latter two variables are allowed to change 
due to new political regimes and financial development. 
Estimates from different specifications may be treated as a robustness check of our 
analysis. One-year up to seven-year-long horizons are investigated for all specifications and 
instruments to observe the reaction of output growth in different time horizons. We also 
consider horizons equal to the length of the crises.  
[Table 3 around here] 
Table 3 presents results from these specifications of the model, where the real credit 
growth is a measure of crisis extent. Estimates of the β parameter in different specifications 
are displayed in rows, and the results for different time horizons are given in columns. The 
values in parentheses denote the t-statistics of the parameter estimates.  
The parameter β indicates how much output growth will change on average after a 1 
percentage point increase in the value of a crisis measure (e.g., credit growth). For example, 
the value 0.130 in the second column, corresponding to the specification S2, denotes that a 
drop in the real credit growth rate by 1 percentage point causes the real GDP growth rate to 
decline on average by 0.130 percentage points over a two-year period.  
The change in credit growth has usually a significant impact on the real output growth 
regardless of the investigated specification and the time horizon. All estimates of the 
parameter β are greater than zero, and range between 0.011 (for the specification S1 and a 
time horizon dependent on the length of each crisis) and 0.249 (for the specification S2 and a 
time horizon of seven years).  
According to Frydl (1999), an average banking crisis typically does not last longer 
than four years. In our sample, Figure 1 suggests that accumulated credit growth was lower on 
average by 12.5 percentage points during the four years of a crisis than in the four-year period 
preceding a crisis. From estimates in Table 3, it is possible to calculate that declining credit 
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growth reduced real GDP growth by 3.0 percentage points during the four years of a typical 
crisis. 
[Table 4 around here] 
 In Table 4 the estimated parameters indicate reactions of the real GDP growth to 
changes in net deposit inflows in an analogous way to Table 3. The values of β parameters are 
generally significantly greater than zero for time horizons longer than one year, which 
suggests that the declining deposits also slow down economic growth during crises.  
The values of β differ considerably for different time horizons. They range between  
-0.131 (for the specification S1 and the one-year horizon) and 0.185 (for the specification S4 
and the time horizon equal to the length of each crisis). However, during the first year of a 
crisis deposits grow at the same rate as one year before the crisis, and the overall impact of 
deposit runs on economic growth is negligible at this time.  
Even for a small value of the β parameter in the four-year horizon, there is some 
impact on real output growth. The average deposit growth rate is 10.2 percentage points lower 
during an average crisis than before a crisis. Such a drop causes the real GDP growth rate to 
decrease by 1.0 percentage point during a four-year crisis.  
[Table 5 around here] 
Table 5 provides information about the impact of changes in the third crisis measure 
on real economic growth. The third measure is the difference between percentage changes in 
money supply and percentage changes of cash in circulation, as described by formula (4). The 
slower the increase of money relative to the growth rate of cash, the more significant the 
impact of a banking crisis on output growth should be.  
Unlike the results from previous tables, the parameters are rarely significantly greater 
than zero, especially in the specifications S3 and S4. For time horizons between four and six 
years the values of parameters are even smaller than zero. This outcome is strongly related to 
the definition of the crisis variable and its behavior in our sample. As discussed earlier, our 
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third measure of crisis extent indicates that crises last three years on average, and that in the 
fourth year their effect vanishes (see Figure 1).  
[Table 6 around here] 
The last instrument employed in our analysis is a percentage change in real money. 
The impact of this measure on output growth is also statistically significant for most 
specifications and time horizons. In specification S4 the β parameter is insignificant in several 
cases, but it is always greater than zero. The values of the parameter range between 0.012 and 
0.265, and they are greater for longer time horizons. For example, selecting a five-year 
horizon and the specification S3 leads to the conclusion that the money growth rate was on 
average 7.9 percentage points lower during crisis periods than before crises. The declining 
money growth reduced real GDP growth by 1.6 percentage points. 
Generally, these results suggest that banking aggregates have a significant impact on 
output growth during banking crises. Although the values of the β parameters in models 
depend on time-horizons and model specifications, these values are typically greater than 
zero.  
The change in parameter values depending on the time horizon can be attributed to 
two aspects. One is the possibility that output effects last longer than crises. Some measures 
of the extent of banking crises may affect output growth with a lag. Therefore, even when the 
crisis fades, output growth will still fall. Then the parameters β for longer periods will have 
higher values, because the accumulated impact of the already terminated crisis on the falling 
GDP growth will be stronger. The second reason is the fact that the number of crises for 
which longer time series are available is limited. The longer the time horizon, the less data are 
available. 
The change in parameter values depending on the specification (S1, S2, S3, and S4) 
can be explained by the fact that some significant variables could be omitted in some more 
restricted specifications (like S1) and some insignificant variables could be included in more 
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general specifications (like S4). Nevertheless, the impact of banking crises on output growth 
is significant in most specifications. 
As a robustness check to our event-study method, we also considered the dynamic 
panel data models similar to those considered by Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and found 
that our two main crisis indicators, i.e. changes in real credit and changes in real money, 
significantly affect output growth during banking crises. More details are presented in 
Appendix 2. 
Finally, it is worth noting that all four crisis measures are correlated with each other. 
Therefore the overall effect on output growth cannot be calculated by summing the individual 
effects of the respective measures. We purely seek to show how individual banking sector 
variables influence economic growth. However, future analyses could construct a cumulative 
measure of the extent of a crisis and measure its impact on GDP growth.  
 
Conclusions 
 In answer to the main questions whether banking crises cause economic slowdown and 
to what extent the size of a crisis affects GDP growth, we conclude that even after controlling 
for the impact of recessions on the size of crises, banking crises cause output growth to slow 
down.  
We obtain our results by proposing a technique that is novel in the area of banking 
crisis research. Our method uses an event-study approach and multi-equation models, and 
applies measures of banking crises constructed from banking sector aggregates, employing a 
large dataset of over 100 banking crises. 
Although the precise impact of some crisis measures is difficult to assess, the typical 
decelerations in growth of credit cause a reduction in accumulated four-year GDP growth by 
around 3 percentage points. Significant relationship between credit and money dynamics, and 
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output growth suggests that the credit and monetary transmission channels are responsible for 
transferring banking crises to real economy. 
Some economists argue that countries experiencing occasional crises grow faster than 
countries with stable financial systems (e.g., Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann, 2005), but 
others point to significant slow down of economies during crises. Our findings support the 
view that crises are costly for economies, at least in the short-term. The results related to 
banking crises are also similar to those obtained for other types of crises, e.g. currency and 
political crises (Cerra, Saxena, 2005; Hutchison, Noy, 2005).  
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Appendix 1 
In this Appendix, we explain the derivation of instruments (6), (7) and (8) in the 
“identification through heteroscedasticity” method developed by Rigobon and Sack (2004) 
and the analogous “identification through changes in mean” method. The model describing 
the link between the crisis measure cit and output growth yit is given by: 
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From the reduced form of the model (A1): 
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we can derive the covariance matrices of the variables cit and yit, in the subsamples T1 and T2, 
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where iTxΩ  is the covariance matrix of the control variables xit in the subsample Ti, i
T
εσ  is the 
variance of εit in the subsample Ti, iTησ  is the variance of ηit in the subsample Ti. We note that 
21 T
x
T
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εε σσ ≠ . Rigobon and Sack (2004) propose to calculate the 
difference between the two covariance matrices to identify the parameter β: 
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Let ij∆Ω  be the (i, j) element of the matrix ∆Ω . We obtain the value of the parameter β by 
dividing the respective elements of the matrix ∆Ω : 
 
11
12
∆Ω
∆Ω
=β           (A4) 
or 
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22
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∆Ω
=β .          (A5) 
Rigobon and Sack show that two alternative estimates of the parameter β , analogous to 
expressions (A4) and (A5), are given by: 
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where 
ii NitT c ][=c  and ii NitT y ][=y  are vectors containing observations of the respective 
variables from the subsample Ti. Ni is the number of observation in the subsample Ti. The 
formulas (A6) and (A7) are equivalent to estimating β with the use of instrumental variables 
vcit and vyit: 
 )()(ˆ 1 ycvccv ′′= −β ,         (A8) 
 )()(ˆ 1 yyvcyv ′′= −β ,         (A9) 
where Nitvc ][=vc , Nitvy ][=vy , Nitc ][=c  and Nity ][=y  are vectors containing all 
observations of the respective variables from our sample.  
Similarly, if we assume that the means of the variables xit and ηit do not change 
between the subsamples T1 and T2 and only the disturbance shock εit changes its mean, we can 
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derive the difference between the expected values of the variables cit and yit, in each 
subsample as: 
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where )( itTiE ε  is the expected value of the disturbance shock εit in the subsample Ti. Now, 
the appropriate formula to estimate β is: 
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where e is the vector of ones. This is equivalent to using the instrument mit defined by (8) in 
the instrumental variable estimation formula:  
)()(ˆ 1 ymcm ′′= −β ,         (A12) 
 where [ ]Nitm=m  is the vector containing all observations of mit. In the generalized method 
of moments all instruments vcit, vyit and mit are used simultaneously to estimate β. 
 
Appendix 2 
As a robustness check to the event study method, we also consider the following 
dynamic panel data model and use the general method of moments (GMM) to estimate its 
parameters: 
ititititit Bxcyy ηβδ +++= −1 .       (A13) 
A transformation is applied to the specification of this model to remove cross-section fixed 
effects. We use both “first differences” and “orthogonal deviations” transformations 
(Arellano, Bond, 1991; Arellano, Bover, 1995). The GMM estimator is the Arellano-Bond 2-
step estimator with White serial-correlation robust standard errors. We employ lagged values 
of the variables yit and cit as dynamic panel instruments for yit and cit, as proposed by Arellano 
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and Bond (1991). In this case we use 14 yearly observations of the respective variables from 
the calm and crisis periods for each of N crisis events.  
The estimates presented in Table A2 suggest that two main crisis indicators, i.e. 
changes in real credit and changes in real money, significantly affect output growth. In most 
cases the values of the parameter β are significantly larger than zero regardless of the 
specification and the estimation method. The Sargan-Hansen tests (J-statistic) of over-
identifying restrictions also indicate that the over-identifying restrictions are valid in our 
specifications. 
These results are in line with those obtained by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), who 
use the same methodology, but different measures of changes in credit and liabilities, as well 
as a different set of countries and a different sample period. In contrast to their study, we 
check if the causation effects from credit and liabilities to output growth are present during 
banking crises. 
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Figure 1: Behavior of macroeconomic variables in pre-crisis and crisis periods 
Panel A: Growth rates of banking sector aggregates accumulated over years 
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Panel B: Accumulated growth of GDP during pre-crisis and crisis periods 
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Table 1: Means and variances of the output growth and crisis measures 
in different sub-samples (three-year calm and crisis periods) 
 Mean Variance 
 
Sub-sample 
 T1 
Sub-sample 
T2 
Name  
of the 
constructed 
instrument 
Sub-sample 
 T1 
Sub-sample 
 T2 
Name  
of the 
constructed 
instrument 
Sub-sample T1 when )( ii dmediand ≤ , sub-sample T2 when )( ii dmediand >  
real GDP 0.07 0.06 
d
itm  0.12 0.13 
d
itvy  
real credit
 
0.14 -0.05 ditm  0.46 0.52 ditvc1  
new deposits
 
0.13 0.04 ditm  1.31 0.49 
d
itvc2  
money-cash
 
-0.02 -0.07 ditm  0.39 0.33 
d
itvc3  
real money -0.38 -0.19 
d
itm  1.66 0.69 
d
itvc4  
Sub-sample T1 when )( ii GNImedianGNI ≤ , sub-sample T2 when )( ii GNImedianGNI >  
real GDP 0.08 0.06 
GNI
itm  0.10 0.11 
GNI
itvy  
real credit
 
-0.03 0.17 GNIitm  0.49 0.33 
GNI
itvc1  
new deposits
 
-0.08 0.18 GNIitm  0.65 0.98 GNIitvc2  
money-cash
 
-0.01 -0.02 GNIitm  0.34 0.33 
GNI
itvc3  
real money -0.10 -0.33 
GNI
itm  0.86 1.35 GNIitvc4  
 Sub-sample T1 when calm period, sub-sample T2 when crisis period 
real GDP 0.08 0.05 crisisitm  0.15 0.12 crisisitvy  
real credit
 
0.15 -0.05 crisisitm  0.50 0.47 crisisitvc1  
new deposits
 
0.08 0.09 crisisitm  0.78 1.15 crisisitvc2  
money-cash
 
-0.01 -0.07 crisisitm  0.28 0.43 
crisis
itvc3  
real money -0.25 -0.29 crisisitm  1.20 1.29 crisisitvc4  
Note: The variable “real GDP” is the growth rate of real GDP, “real credit” is the growth rate 
of real credit, “money-cash” is the difference between the growth rates of money and cash, 
and “real money” is the growth rate of real money. The variable di is a measure of financial 
development (deposits divided by money aggregate) in country i, GNIi is a measure of 
economic development (GNI per capita in 1975).  
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Table 2: Pairwise correlations between instruments and crisis measures and output 
growth (three-year calm and crisis periods) 
Instrument real GDP real credit new deposits money-cash real money 
d
itvy  0.19 0.00 0.11 -0.08 -0.01 
d
itvc1  0.06 0.11 0.17 -0.19* -0.09 
d
itvc2  0.15 0.16 -0.75* 0.33* 0.76* 
d
itvc3  -0.05 -0.16* 0.34* -0.12 -0.43* 
d
itvc4  -0.04 -0.05 0.75* -0.40* -0.69* 
d
itm  -0.05 -0.19* -0.05 -0.06* 0.07* 
GNI
itvy  0.06 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 -0.08 
GNI
itvc1  -0.21 -0.33* -0.03 0.14 -0.21 
GNI
itvc2  0.01 -0.04 0.32 0.02 -0.36* 
GNI
itvc3  -0.02 0.13 0.01 -0.04 0.20* 
GNI
itvc4  -0.01 -0.24* -0.37* 0.19 0.42* 
GNI
itm  -0.07 0.23* 0.16 -0.01 -0.10* 
crisis
itvy  -0.21 -0.10 -0.14 -0.08 -0.04 
crisis
itvc1  -0.02 -0.08 -0.22 0.02 0.12 
crisis
itvc2  -0.18 -0.23 0.37 -0.29 -0.27 
crisis
itvc3  -0.02 0.05 -0.29* 0.41* 0.11 
crisis
itvc4  0.01 0.16* -0.26* 0.13* 0.07 
crisis
itm  -0.13 -0.20* 0.00 -0.09* -0.01 
Note: All names of instruments and other variables are explained in Table 1. The 
correlations corresponding to the variables that are used as econometric 
instruments for respective crisis measures are denoted with “*”.  
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Table 3: Output growth reactions to one percentage point increase of real credit  
at different time horizons 
  1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 
Length 
of the 
crisis 
S1 β 0.073* 0.036 0.056* 0.095*** 0.091** 0.098** 0.161*** 0.011 
 t(β) (1.738) (0.910) (1.764) (2.854) (2.140) (2.361) (3.198) (0.406) 
 N 185 183 181 169 163 151 130 152 
 J(d.f.) 0.052 0.029 0.027 0.030 0.034 0.042 0.068 0.078 
 d.f. 7 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 
S2 β 0.077 0.130*** 0.166*** 0.215*** 0.212*** 0.067*** 0.249*** 0.102* 
 t(β) (1.624) (3.269) (4.356) (4.943) (3.091) (2.623) (3.165) (1.712) 
 N 177 165 159 143 129 109 79 137 
 J(d.f.) 0.057 0.053 0.070 0.073 0.058 0.076 0.056 0.073 
 d.f. 7 7 7 7 5 7 7 6 
S3 β 0.116** 0.131*** 0.120*** 0.235*** 0.187*** 0.070** 0.242*** 0.050* 
 t(β) (2.168) (3.409) (2.383) (5.354) (3.895) (2.531) (2.987) (1.648) 
 N 172 160 154 142 128 108 78 134 
 J(d.f.) 0.051 0.062 0.004 0.062 0.070 0.082 0.072 0.073 
 d.f. 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 
S4 β 0.093 0.157*** 0.160*** 0.240*** 0.144*** 0.057** 0.073* 0.047 
 t(β) (1.606) (3.405) (3.553) (4.688) (3.669) (2.394) (1.812) (1.554) 
 N 172 160 154 140 126 108 78 134 
 J(d.f.) 0.045 0.048 0.066 0.046 0.065 0.073 0.109 0.063 
 d.f. 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Note: Degrees of freedom, d.f., denote the number of instruments minus 1. The instruments 
{md, vc4crisis, mGNI, vc4GNI, mcrisis, vc3d, vc1GNI} are ranked from these most correlated with the 
crisis measure and least correlated with the output growth to those least correlated with the 
crisis measure and most correlated with the output growth. If less instruments are used, as 
indicated by the degrees of freedom, then only those instruments with the highest rank are 
included. t(β) is the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that β = 0,  J(d.f.) is the Sargan-
Hansen statistic testing the null hypothesis that the GMM overidentifying restrictions are 
valid. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance of the statistics at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
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Table 4: Output growth reactions to one percentage point increase of deposits 
at different time horizons 
  1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 
Length 
of the 
crisis 
S1 β -0.131* 0.177* 0.128*** 0.071* 0.067 0.134** 0.036 0.034* 
 t(β) (1.737) (1.808) (2.937) (1.656) (1.514) (2.092) (0.826) (1.914) 
 N 179 177 171 155 145 125 101 155 
 J(d.f.) 0.027 0.020 0.012 0.056 0.041 0.020 0.055 0.033 
 d.f. 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
S2 β -0.089 0.149 0.127** 0.106* 0.049 0.112* 0.074 0.145* 
 t(β) (1.475) (1.375) (1.984) (1.917) (1.077) (1.763) (1.362) (1.674) 
 N 179 167 161 145 131 111 79 137 
 J(d.f.) 0.043 0.028 0.016 0.038 0.045 0.027 0.062 0.024 
 d.f. 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
S3 β -0.100 0.236* 0.104** 0.100* 0.047 0.112* 0.077 0.154* 
 t(β) (1.188) (1.710) (2.091) (1.861) (1.198) (1.850) (1.500) (1.799) 
 N 174 162 156 144 130 110 78 134 
 J(d.f.) 0.037 0.019 0.021 0.033 0.040 0.028 0.058 0.021 
 d.f. 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
S4 β -0.014 0.150* 0.079** 0.095** 0.076* 0.087* 0.067 0.185** 
 t(β) (0.225) (1.912) (2.158) (2.028) (1.970) (1.687) (1.365) (2.089) 
 N 174 162 156 142 128 110 78 134 
 J(d.f.) 0.047 0.031 0.020 0.031 0.020 0.014 0.049 0.013 
 d.f. 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Note: Degrees of freedom, d.f., denote the number of instruments minus 1. The instruments  
{ vc4d, vc4GNI, vc3crisis, vc4crisis, vc3d, vc2d } are ranked from these most correlated with the 
crisis measure and least correlated with the output growth to those least correlated with the 
crisis measure and most correlated with the output growth. If less instruments are used, as 
indicated by the degrees of freedom, then only those instruments with the highest rank are 
included. t(β) is the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that β = 0,  J(d.f.) is the Sargan-
Hansen statistic testing the null hypothesis that the GMM overidentifying restrictions are 
valid. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance of the statistics at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
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Table 5: Output growth reactions to one percentage point increase of the difference 
between growth of money and growth of cash at different time horizons 
  1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 
Length 
of the 
crisis 
S1 β 0.481** 0.117*** 0.398*** -0.059 -0.078 0.402 0.356*** -0.053 
 t(β) (2.526) (2.840) (4.095) (1.540) (1.236) (1.210) (4.323) (0.531) 
 N 177 175 169 153 145 125 98 152 
 J(d.f.) 0.018 0.043 0.042 0.047 0.041 0.036 0.094 0.045 
 d.f. 6 4 6 4 4 3 6 4 
S2 β 0.437** 0.066* 0.339*** -0.048 -0.068 -0.004 0.374*** 0.004 
 t(β) (2.358) (1.719) (3.644) (1.510) (1.272) (0.069) (3.731) (0.081) 
 N 177 165 159 143 131 109 79 137 
 J(d.f.) 0.019 0.045 0.048 0.054 0.064 0.091 0.071 0.064 
 d.f. 6 4 6 4 5 6 6 6 
S3 β 0.362** 0.019 -0.015 -0.040 -0.063 0.008 0.402*** -0.029 
 t(β) (2.550) (0.620) (0.454) (1.131) (1.139) (0.164) (3.517) (0.478) 
 N 172 160 156 142 130 108 78 134 
 J(d.f.) 0.047 0.062 0.027 0.043 0.071 0.085 0.067 0.058 
 d.f. 6 6 2 4 6 6 6 6 
S4 β 0.214* -0.016 -0.031 -0.074 -0.032 -0.006 0.320*** -0.013 
 t(β) (1.560) (0.463) (0.926) (1.652) (0.719) (0.120) (3.407) (0.233) 
 N 172 160 154 140 128 108 78 134 
 J(d.f.) 0.048 0.063 0.028 0.010 0.067 0.076 0.070 0.056 
 d.f. 6 6 4 4 5 6 6 6 
Note: Degrees of freedom, d.f., denote the number of instruments minus 1. The instruments  
{ vc3crisis, vc4d, vc4GNI, vc2d, vc1d, mcrisis, md } are ranked from these most correlated with the 
crisis measure and least correlated with the output growth to those least correlated with the 
crisis measure and most correlated with the output growth. If less instruments are used, as 
indicated by the degrees of freedom, then only those instruments with the highest rank are 
included. t(β) is the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that β = 0,  J(d.f.) is the Sargan-
Hansen statistic testing the null hypothesis that the GMM overidentifying restrictions are 
valid. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance of the statistics at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
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Table 6: Output growth reactions to one percentage point increase of money supply  
at different time horizons 
  1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 
Length 
of the 
crisis 
S1 β 0.083** 0.072*** 0.128** 0.039** 0.165*** 0.094*** 0.225*** 0.110** 
 t(β) (2.009) (3.190) (2.205) (2.536) (3.644) (3.185) (4.080) (2.118) 
 N 179 177 171 155 145 125 101 155 
 J(d.f.) 0.053 0.043 0.014 0.071 0.059 0.060 0.042 0.059 
 d.f. 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 
S2 β 0.111** 0.060** 0.123** 0.039** 0.152*** 0.046** 0.260*** 0.070* 
 t(β) (2.141) (2.079) (2.065) (2.200) (3.268) (2.083) (4.279) (1.743) 
 N 179 167 161 145 131 111 79 137 
 J(d.f.) 0.055 0.054 0.013 0.068 0.066 0.081 0.046 0.077 
 d.f. 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 
S3 β 0.085* 0.061* 0.066* 0.029 0.208*** 0.189*** 0.265*** 0.096*** 
 t(β) (1.954) (1.838) (1.866) (1.226) (3.509) (3.550) (4.382) (2.583) 
 N 174 162 156 144 130 110 78 134 
 J(d.f.) 0.051 0.066 0.047 0.070 0.054 0.067 0.038 0.051 
 d.f. 7 7 5 6 7 7 7 7 
S4 β 0.055 0.062 0.030 0.012 0.040 0.052* 0.260*** 0.069** 
 t(β) (1.274) (1.530) (1.552) (0.498) (1.433) (1.841) (4.354) (2.453) 
 N 174 162 156 142 128 110 78 134 
 J(d.f.) 0.034 0.030 0.056 0.034 0.031 0.062 0.034 0.026 
 d.f. 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Note: Degrees of freedom, d.f., denote the number of instruments minus 1. The instruments  
{ vc4d, vc4GNI, vc3d, vc2GNI, vc3GNI, md, mGNI, vc2d } are ranked from these most correlated 
with the crisis measure and least correlated with the output growth to those least correlated 
with the crisis measure and most correlated with the output growth. If less instruments are 
used, as indicated by the degrees of freedom, then only those instruments with the highest 
rank are included. t(β) is the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that β = 0,  J(d.f.) is the 
Sargan-Hansen statistic testing the null hypothesis that the GMM overidentifying restrictions 
are valid. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance of the statistics at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
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Table A1: Periods of banking crises  
Developed countries: 
Australia 1989-1992 (1989),Canada 1983-1985 (1983), Denmark 1987-1992 (1987), Finland 
1991-1994 (1991), France 1994-1995 (1994), Germany late 1970s-late 1970s (1977), Greece 
1991-1995 (1991), Hong Kong 1982-1983 (1982), Hong Kong 1998-1998 (1998), Iceland 
1985-1986 (1985), Iceland 1993-1993 (1993), Italy 1990-1995 (1990), Japan 1991-2003+ 
(1991), Korea 1997-2003+ (1997), New Zealand 1987-1990 (1987), Norway 1987-1993 
(1987), Spain 1977-1985 (1977), Sweden 1991-1991 (1991), United Kingdom 1974-1976 
(1974), United Kingdom 1980s-1990s (1990), United States 1984-1991 (1986), 
Developing countries:     
Algeria 1990-1992 (1990), Argentina 1980-1982 (1980), Argentina 1989-1990 (1989), 
Argentina 1995-1995 (1995), Argentina 2001-2003+ (2001), Azerbaijan 1995-? (1995), 
Bangladesh late 1980s-1996 (1989), Benin 1988-1990 (1988), Bolivia 1986-1988 (1986), 
Bolivia 1994-? (1994), Botswana 1994-1995 (1994), Brazil 1990-1990 (1990), Brazil 1994-
1999 (1994), Bulgaria 1995-1997 (1995), Burkina Faso 1988-1994 (1988), Burundi 1994-? 
(1994), Cameroon 1987-1993 (1987), Cameroon 1995-1998 (1995), Central Africa Republic 
1988-1999 (1988), Chad 1992-1992 (1992), Chile 1976-1976 (1976), Chile 1981-1986 
(1981), Colombia 1982-1987 (1982), Congo, Democratic Republic of (former Zaire) 1991-
1992 (1991), Congo, Republic of 1992-2003+ (1992), Costa Rica 1987(?)-? (1987), Costa 
Rica 1994-? (1994), Cote d'Ivoire 1988-1991 (1988), Croatia 1996-1996 (1996), Ecuador 
early 1980s-? (1982), Ecuador 1996-1997 (1991), Ecuador 1998-2003+ (1998), Egypt 1991-
1995 (1991), El Salvador 1989-1989 (1989), Ethiopia 1994-1995 (1994), Gabon 1995-? 
(1995), Gambia 1985-1992 (1985), Ghana 1982-1989 (1982), Guinea-Bissau 1995-? (1995), 
Hungary 1991-1995 (1991), India 1993-2003+ (1993), Indonesia 1994-1994 (1994), 
Indonesia 1997-2003+ (1997), Israel 1977-1983 (1977), Jamaica 1994-1994 (1994), Jordan 
1989-1990 (1989), Kenya 1985-1989 (1985), Kenya 1992-1992 (1992), Kenya 1996-? 
(1996), Kuwait 1980s-1980s (1980), Latvia 1995-2003+ (1995), Lesotho 1988-? (1988), 
Lithuania 1995-1996 (1995), Madagascar 1988-1988 (1988), Mali 1987-1989 (1987), 
Malaysia 1985-1988 (1985), Malaysia 1997-2003+ (1997), Mauritius 1996-1996 (1996), 
Mexico 1981-1991 (1981), Mexico 1994-1997 (1994), Morocco early 1980s-? (1981), 
Mozambique 1987-1995(?) (1987), Myanmar 1996-? (1996), Nepal 1988-1988 (1988), Niger 
1983-? (1983), Nigeria 1997-1997 (1993), Panama 1988-1989 (1988), Papua New Guinea 
1989-? (1988), Paraguay 1995-1999 (1995), Paraguay 2001-2003+ (2001), Peru 1983-1990 
(1983), Philippines 1981-1987 (1981), Philippines 1998-2003+ (1998), Poland 1990s-1990s 
(1993), Romania 1990-2003+ (1990), Russia 1995-1995 (1995), Russia 1998-1999 (1998), 
Rwanda 1991-? (1991), Senegal 1988-1991 (1988), Sierra Leone 1990-2003+ (1990), 
Singapore 1982-1982 (1982), Slovenia 1992-1994 (1992), South Africa 1977-1977 (1977), 
South Africa 1989-? (1989), Sri Lanka 1989-1993 (1989), Swaziland 1995-1995 (1995), 
Tanzania late 1980s-1990s (1989), Thailand 1983-1987 (1983), Thailand 1997-2003+ 
(1997), Togo 1993-1995 (1993), Trinidad and Tobago 1982-1993 (1982), Tunisia 1991-1995 
(1991), Turkey 1982-1985 (1982), Turkey 1994-1994 (1994), Turkey 2000-2003+ (2000), 
Uganda 1994-2003+ (1994), Ukraine 1997-1998 (1997), Uruguay 1981-1984 (1981), 
Uruguay 2002-2003+ (2002), Venezuela late 1970s-1980s (1980), Venezuela 1994-1995 
(1994), Vietnam 1997-2003+ (1997), Zambia 1995-1995 (1995), Zimbabwe 1995-2003+ 
(1995). 
Note: the symbol “?” denotes unknown date, “+” denotes that the crisis was not over in 2003. 
The starting dates of crisis used in our empirical analysis are presented in parentheses. Data 
from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2002).    
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Table A2: Robustness check - the GMM estimation of the dynamic panel data model 
Measure 
of crisis 
extent(a) 
Specification 
of the 
instrumental 
variables(b) 
Estimation 
method(c) 
Period 
dummies 
Model 
specification(d) 
Parameter 
β 
(e) 
Std. 
errors. 
of β (f) 
Sargan 
J 
statistic 
(g)
 
p-value 
of the J 
statistic 
credit i=1 difference yes S4 0.008** 0.0010 95.52 0.495 
credit i=1 difference no S4 0.010** 0.0005 102.37 0.609 
credit i=1 difference no S2 0.007** 0.0002 112.43 0.418 
credit i=1 difference no S1 0.019** 0.0001 119.75 0.464 
credit i=1 orthogonal yes S4 0.009** 0.0011 94.99 0.510 
credit i=1 orthogonal no S4 0.011** 0.0003 109.89 0.405 
credit i=1 orthogonal no S2 0.010** 0.0003 110.56 0.467 
credit i=1 orthogonal no S1 0.016** 0.0001 119.67 0.466 
credit i=2 difference yes S4 0.004** 0.0012 93.27 0.560 
credit i=2 difference no S4 0.005** 0.0011 102.19 0.613 
credit i=2 difference no S2  -0.002** 0.0002 112.89 0.406 
credit i=2 difference no S1 0.008** 0.0002 118.77 0.489 
money i=1 difference yes S4 0.030** 0.0016 95.38 0.556 
money i=1 difference no S4 0.035** 0.0004 109.19 0.477 
money i=1 difference no S2 0.037** 0.0002 113.35 0.446 
money i=1 difference no S1 0.062** 0.0003 121.75 0.464 
money i=1 orthogonal yes S4 0.036** 0.0015 102.86 0.349 
money i=1 orthogonal no S4 0.041** 0.0005 109.94 0.457 
money i=1 orthogonal no S2 0.042** 0.0005 111.63 0.492 
money i=1 orthogonal no S1 0.059** 0.0001 120.24 0.502 
money i=2 difference yes S4  -0.006** 0.0022 94.33 0.586 
money i=2 difference no S4  -0.001 0.0009 108.32 0.500 
money i=2 difference no S2  -0.005** 0.0010 113.53 0.442 
money i=2 difference no S1 0.021** 0.0006 122.95 0.433 
Note: (a) credit is defined as the log change in real credit, money is defined as the log change 
in real money; (b) i=1 and i=2 denote that all valid lags in the dynamic panel instruments up 
to t-i for the observation t of the crisis variable are used in the Arellano-Bond method; (c) 
difference is the Arellano-Bond first-differences estimator, orthogonal is the orthogonal 
deviations estimator, as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995); (d) model specifications are 
analogous to those in previous tables. However, the GNI per capita, currcrisisit, fxregimeit, 
debtcrisisit and systemicit are not used in the specifications S2 and S4. Instead period dummy 
variables are used. (e) The β parameter measures impact of the crisis variable on GDP growth. 
Symbol * denotes significance of the parameter at the 5% level and ** denotes significance at 
the 1% level. (f) White period robust standard errors are computed; (g) The Sargan-Hansen 
test (J-statistic) of overidentifying restrictions. 
